Sperry on consciousness as an emergent causal agent

Journal/Book: Aust J Psychol. 1997; 49: 1 Grattan Street, Carlton Victoria 3053, Australia. Australian Psychological Soc. 152-155.

Abstract: The neuroscientist Roger Sperry argues for a theory of consciousness which sees it as an emergent but not dualist entity, causally efficacious in the production of behaviour. This paper raises three issues: whether a non-metaphysical account of emergent phenomena is possible, whether consciousness or a similar emergent entity could ''supervene'' to be causally active in the production of behaviour, and whether consciousness conceived of as a state is to commit the fallacy of reification.

Note: Article McMullen T, Univ Sydney, Dept Psychol, Sydney, NSW 2006, AUSTRALIA

Keyword(s): SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE; COGNITIVE REVOLUTION; MIND

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