Society as a mental construction? Searle versus Bourdieu

Journal/Book: Kolner Z Soziol Sozialpsychol. 2000; 52: Postfach 5829, W-6200 Wiesbaden, Germany. Westdeutscher Verlag Gmbh. 428+.

Abstract: Philosophy and sociology, though partly appearing to refer to the same objects, differ in their ways of describing the world. Taking John Searle and Pierre Bourdieu as examples, the different ways of thinking typically of these disciplines are explored. In Searle's perspective, the social world is constructed by intentional acts which can be represented, in formal logic, as a particular kind of speech acts. Guided by a ''collective intentionality'', social facts are constructed by means of ''brute'' facts. Contrary to Searle's basic assumption of social reality being produced by mental acts, Bourdieu proposes a complex interplay, based on material acts, of habitus and social practice, which itself is being governed by the specific logic of social fields. Essentially relying on the mediating activity of the body, subjects internalize a society which itself is perpetually re-created by subjects' acts. Like Bourdieu, Searle rejects the idea of social subjects being guided, in their regular actions, by interior representations of the rule structure of the social world. Rather than rule following, Searle proposes an original solution: relying on their specific backgrounds, subjects in acting create abilities and competencies which art: a functional equivalent of the regularity of the social world. This concept of functional equivalence can be transferred to and made fruitful for the concept of habitus. While the concept of rule must be abandoned for the description of background and habitus, it is indispensable, in philosophy as well as sociology, for the characterization of the normative aspects of social acts.

Note: Article Gebauer G, Free Univ Berlin, Inst Philosophy, Schwendener Str 8, D-14195 Berlin, GERMANY

Keyword(s): speech acts; intentionality; logical structure of the world; habitus; social field; social rules; regularity; functional equivalence; normativity of social actions

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