Our understanding of other minds - Theory of mind and the intentional stance

Journal/Book: J Conscious Stud. 2000; 7: PO Box 1, Thorverton Ex5 5Yx, England. Imprint Academic. 12-24.

Abstract: Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which ave also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a 'theory of mind: and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all but meaningless This entailment should not be accepted; instead, Dennett's position that intentional behaviour is best predictable via the Intentional stance should be rejected in favour of a pluralistic view of behaviour prediction. I introduce an additional method which humans often use to predict intentional and non-intentional behaviour which could be called the inductive stance.

Note: Article Andrews K, Appalachian State Univ, Dept Philosophy & Relig, Boone,NC 28608 USA

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