Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness

Journal/Book: Behav Brain Sci. 1999; 22: 40 West 20Th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA. Cambridge Univ Press. 172+.

Abstract: O'Brien & Opie defend a ''vehicle'' rather than a ''process'' theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is ''explicit,'' I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fts more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.

Note: Editorial Velmans M, Univ London Goldsmiths Coll, Dept Psychol, London SE14 6NW, ENGLAND

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