Dis/connecting the concepts of consciousness: the virtues of interdisciplinarity

Journal/Book: New Idea Psychol. 1999; 17: the Boulevard Langford Lane, Kidlington, Oxford Ox5 1GB, England. Pergamon-Elsevier Science Ltd. 291-308.

Abstract: Our ordinary concept of consciousness refers to a largely heterogeneous collection of phenomena. For eliminativists, this situation implies that consciousness is not a natural kind. They hold that traditional concepts of consciousness should be eliminated. Reductionists, on the other hand, claim that consciousness is a natural kind. They have defended the view that the essence or unifying principle of consciousness is yet to be discovered by physical science. I claim that both eliminativism and reductionism rest on mistaken theories of reference. In this paper, a third option is explored, namely, that ''consciousness'' involves a plurality of word-world links. Even if consciousness does not have natural-kind status, then, we might still say it refers to a disjoint array of aspects of reality: ''consciousness'' is associated with, what Kitcher (1993, The advancement of science: Science without legend, objectivity without illusion. New York: Oxford University Press) has termed, a ''reference potential''. Theory changes may be more accurately described as shifting reference potentials under the influence of interdisciplinary cooperation and competition. K. H. Pribram's ideas on upward (and downward) validation can be fleshed out with these proposals. His work on consciousness is offered as an illustration of the virtues of interdisciplinarity. It is concluded that the classical options of reduction and elimination cannot do justice to the complexities of consciousness and the dynamics of consciousness research.

Note: Article Schouten MKD, Free Univ Amsterdam, Dept Psychol, De Boelelaan 1111, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS

Keyword(s): consciousness; eliminativism; holonomic brain theory; interdisciplinarity; reductionism; reference

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