Concepts: where Fodor went wrong

Author(s): Bickhard, M. H.

Journal/Book: Philos Psychol. 1999; 12: PO Box 25, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, England Ox14 3Ue. Carfax Publ Co. 5-23.

Abstract: In keeping with other recent efforts, Fodor's CONCEPTS focuses on the metaphysics of conceptual content, bracketing such epistemological questions as, ''How call we Know the contents of our concepts?'' Fodor's metaphysical account of concepts, called ''informational atomism,'' stipulates that the contents of a subject's concepts are fixed by, the nomological lockings between the subject and the world. After sketching Fodor's ''what else?'' argument in support of this view, we offer a number of related criticisms. All paint to the same conclusion: Fodor is ultimately not merely bracketing the epistemology of conceptual content; his theory makes answers to the epistemological questions impossible.

Note: Article Levine A, Lehigh Univ, Dept Philosophy, 15 Univ Dr, Bethlehem,PA 18015 USA

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