Understanding the ''cognitive revolution'' in psychology

Journal/Book: J Hist Behav Sci. 1999; 35: 605 Third Ave, New York, NY 10158-0012, USA. John Wiley & Sons Inc. 1-22.

Abstract: In this paper it is argued that the ''cognitive revolution'' in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian ''paradigm shift,'' or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more ''liberalized'' forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of ''structuralist'' psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) ''intervening variables'' by genuine ''hypothetical constructs'' possessing cognitive ''surplus meaning,'' and that the ''cognitive revolution'' of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s.

Note: Article Greenwood JD, CUNY City Coll, Dept Philosophy, 138th St & Covent Ave, New York,NY 10031 USA

Keyword(s): VERBAL REPORTS; SCIENCE

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