The contextual stance

Journal/Book: Philos Psychol. 1999; 12: PO Box 25, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, England Ox14 3Ue. Carfax Publ Co. 25-46.

Abstract: The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived front contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted bz view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional systems is an exemplar of the interpretive stance radical behaviorism requires; a corresponding interpretive position can be based initially, on a radical behaviorist view of human behavior and its determinants. This ''contextual stance'' is ontologically and methodologically distinct from the intentional stance over the range of explanations for which scientific psychology, cognitive or behaviorist, is responsible.

Note: Article Foxall GR, Univ Keele, Keele ST5 5BG, Staffs, ENGLAND

Keyword(s): BEHAVIORIST

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