Psychological ascription

Journal/Book: Theor Psychol. 1998; 8: 2455 Teller Rd, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320. Sage Publications Inc. 503-526.

Abstract: In this paper an account of the semantics of psychological ascription in terms of sentential modeling is articulated and defended. It is suggested that psychological ascriptions, both lay and scientific, are theoretical descriptions, but denied that the semantics of psychological descriptions are determined by the causal explanatory propositions relating observable stimuli, psychological states and observable behavior in which they regularly figure-the 'theory-theory' account of the semantics of psychological ascription favored by most contemporary psychologists and philosophers. It is argued that the recognition of the alternative account of the semantics of psychological ascription in terms of sentential modeling enables one to take a less 'theory-theory'-informed look at the implications of recent research on 'self-perception' and the 'child's theory of mind'.

Note: Article Greenwood JD, CUNY City Coll, Dept Philosophy, 138TH St & Convent Ave, New York,NY 10031 USA

Keyword(s): psychological ascription; theoretical model; 'theory-theory'; FALSE BELIEF; FOLK PSYCHOLOGY; REALISM; MIND

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