Pretence, pretending and metarepresenting

Journal/Book: Mind Lang. 1998; 13: 108 Cowley Rd, Oxford OX4 1JF, Oxon, England. Blackwell Publ Ltd. 35-55.

Abstract: I assess the claim that metarepresentation is a key notion in understanding the nature and development of our capacity to engage in pretence. I argue that the metarepresentational programme is unhelpful in explaining how pretence operates and, in particular, how agents distinguish pretence from belief. I sketch an alternative approach to the relations between pretending and believing. This depends on a distinction between pretending and pretence, and upon the claim that pretence stands to pretending as truth stands to belief.

Note: Article Currie G, Flinders Univ S Australia, Dept Philosophy, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide, SA 5001, AUSTRALIA

Keyword(s): MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS; YOUNG-CHILDREN; MIND; PLAY; REALITY; IMAGINATION; MEMORIES; AUTISM

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