The nature of nature: rethinking naturalistic theories of intentionality

Journal/Book: Philos Psychol. 1997; 10: PO Box 25, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, England OX14 3UE. Carfax Publ Ltd. 309-322.

Abstract: While there is controversy over which of several naturalistic theories of the mental is most plausible, there is consensus regarding the desideratum of a naturalistically respectable theory. A naturalistic theory of the mental, it is agreed, must explicate representation in nonintentional terms. I argue that this constraint does not get at the heart of what it is to be natural On the one hand, it fails to provide us with a meaningful distinction between the natural and the unnatural. On the other hand, it unfairly suggests that we withhold judgment on those successes our sciences of the mind have already achieved until a convincing decomposition of the mental is available. I urge a new conception of naturalism that focuses less upon ontological considerations and more upon methodological ones.

Note: Article Shapiro LA, Univ Wisconsin, Dept Philosophy, 5185 Hc White Hall, Madison,WI 53706 USA

Zurück | Weiter