What do we mean by consciousness and how can we account for the conscious nature of mental contents?

Journal/Book: Sprache Kognit. 1997; 16: Langgass-Strasse 76, CH-3000 Bern 9, Switzerland. Verlag Hans Huber. 134-142.

Abstract: The following answer is offered to the first of the two questions: Mental contents are conscious to the extent they are represented in relation to the mental self. From this follows (1) that mental contents are conscious if and when they are represented in relation to the mental self and (2) that the conscious nature of mental contents is implied by the fact that this relation is represented. As to the second question the following answer is offered: Theories that account for the conscious nature of mental contents need to combine ultimate and proximate accounts. Ultimate accounts offer the suprapersonal stories explaining the emergence of personal experience. Proximate accounts offer subpersonal mechanisms underlying personal experience. Both answers are not supposed to form a theory of consciousness. Rather, they specify the requirements such theories must meet.

Note: Article Prinz W, Max Planck Inst Psychol Res, Leopoldstr 24, D-80802 Munich, GERMANY

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