Interpretation versus explanation in the critique of science

Journal/Book: Sci Context. 1997; 10: 40 West 20TH Street, New York, NY 10011-4211. Cambridge Univ Press. 113-128.

Abstract: This paper distinguishes two tasks of the critical study of science: explanation and interpretation. Theorists in social and cultural studies of science have criticized philosophy of science as incapable of illuminating ''real science,'' and hence irrelevant to the explanation of science. To the extent that such criticism presumes that the illumination of real science involves providing a causal account of the closure of controversy or of the making of a scientific fact, it restricts science studies unnecessarily as well as mistaking the purpose and role of philosophy of science. Philosophical accounts of science can be understood as offering strategies for interpretation of research programs. These may be legitimating or critical in their import. Those in the latter category have the capacity to lay bare the role of cultural, social, and metaphysical preconceptions in the supportive reasoning for, and the reception of, scientific theories, hypotheses, and methodological constraints. Contextual empiricism is offered as the source of such an interpretive strategy, whose working is illustrated by a discussion of some so-called cognitive values.

Note: Article Longino HE, Univ Minnesota, Dept Womens Studies, Minneapolis,MN 55455 USA

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