Consciousness in cognitive psychology

Journal/Book: Sprache Kognit. 1997; 16: Langgass-Strasse 76, CH-3000 Bern 9, Switzerland. Verlag Hans Huber. 143-150.

Abstract: In cognitive psychology hypotheses concerning consciousness are problematic in several respects. Mainly, it is not clear how to interpret and test them. An answer to these questions is presented. Then the most important hypotheses of this kind are analyzed. It turns out that working memory, focal attention, and controlled processes roughly correspond to consciousness though there is no perfect congruence. Why should cognitive psychology deal with consciousness? It is argued that investigating the connection between cognitive constructs and phenomenal consciousness is an end in itself even if consciousness turns out to be unnecessary for the explanation of behaviour.

Note: Article Gadenne V, Johannes Kepler Univ, Inst Philosophie & Wissensch Theorie, A-4040 Linz, AUSTRIA

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