Naturalizing the mind, by F. Dretske

Journal/Book: Philos Psychol. 1997; 10: PO Box 25, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, England OX14 3UE. Carfax Publ Co. 541-550.

Abstract: Fred Dretske asserts that the conscious or phenomenal experiences associated with our perceptual states-e.g. The qualitative or subjective features involved in visual or auditory states-are identical to properties that things have according to our representations of them. This is Dretske's version of the currently popular representational theory of consciousness. After explicating the core of Dretske's representational thesis, I offer two criticisms. I suggest that Dretske's view fails to apply to a broad range of mental phenomena that have rather distinctive subjective or qualitative features. I also suggest that Dretske's view, in identifying conscious experiences with features of our perceptual states, casts its aim too law. It deflates further than it should and, in consequence, fails to capture what are arguably some of the most important phenomena associated with our conscious lives.

Note: Book Review Davies PS, Coll William & Mary, Dept Philosophy, Williamsburg,VA 23187 USA

Zurück | Weiter