Epistemological realism in psychology: Kant or won't?

Author(s): Darlington, C. L.

Journal/Book: N Z J Psychol. 1996; 25: Business Manager, PO Box 4092, Wellington, New Zealand. New Zealand Psychol Soc. 13-20.

Abstract: This paper critically evaluates the implications of the philosophical assumptions of realism, determinism and materialism, as proposed by the philosopher John Anderson, for the development of modern empirical psychology. Because of the logical problems with the alternative views, it is concluded that Andersonian realism, determinism and materialism (specifically functionalism) are the most valid philosophical positions for the foundations of experimental psychology. The implications of these philosophical assumptions for the nature of explanation within psychology, for the position of psychology within the sciences, and for ethical issues within psychology and psychiatry, are discussed. It is concluded: 1) that realism, determinism and materialism provide the only means by which psychology can aspire to provide non-circular explanations of behaviour; 2) that psychology cannot isolate itself from the rest of the biological sciences without its contributions to the analysis of behaviour being superseded by other areas of neuroscience, which may borrow psychological techniques and apply them without reference to the theoretical perspectives of psychology; 3) that the acceptance of realism, determinism and materialism within psychology would accelerate the process by which psychological and psychiatric disorders are recognised as being biological in basis, just as 'somatic' disorders such as diabetes and asthma.

Note: Article PF Smith, Univ Otago, Sch Med, Dept Pharmacol, Dunedin, New Zealand

Keyword(s): HUMAN-BRAIN; MEMORY

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