The case for intrinsic theory .1. An introduction

Journal/Book: J Mind Behav. 1996; 17: PO Box 522, Village Station, New York, NY 10014. Inst Mind Behavior Inc. 267-285.

Abstract: This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the ''intrinsic'' kind of explanatory account of ''consciousness(4).'' ''Consciousness(4)'' has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence instances (the ''conscious(4)'' ones) wherein there takes place an immediate awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their very occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness amounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awareness. An account of consciousness(4) that properly comes under the heading of ''intrinsic theory'' is distinguished by the thesis that a mental-occurrence instance's being consciou(4)is an intrinsic property rather than an external-relational property of that mental-occurrence instance. My hope for the present series of articles is that, by the end, the case for intrinsic theory will he so evidently strong, or at least so vivid, that all psychologists of consciousness will have to address intrinsic theory and its explanandum of consciousness(4). In this article, I set the stage by (a) rendering some of the relevant meanings explicit, (b) spelling out my purpose and approach to making the case for intrinsic theory, (c) providing some context for the discussions to follow, and (d) mentioning important objections to intrinsic theory that have been voiced in the literature. In the case of an [experience] directed to something immanent, or briefly expressed, a perception of something immanent (so-called ''internal'' perception), [experience and experienced] form essentially an unmediated unity, that of a single concrete cogitatio. Here the perceiving includes its Object in itself in such a manner that it only can be separated abstractively, only as an essentially non-selfsufficient moment, from its Object. (Husserl, 1913/1983,pp. 79-80; his later corrections).

Note: Editorial T Natsoulas, Univ Calif Davis, Dept Psychol, Room 179, Herbert a Young Hall, Davis, CA 95616 USA

Keyword(s): APPENDAGE THEORY; CONSCIOUSNESS; MEMORY

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