Lost the plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness
Journal/Book: Mind Lang. 1996; 11: 108 Cowley Rd, Oxford, Oxon, England OX4 1JF. Blackwell Publ Ltd. 1-43.
Abstract: In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, avery brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions-for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruct Dennett's argument, providing both the philosophical views behind the empirical premises, and the hidden empirical arguments behind the derivation of the philosophical conclusions.
Note: Article K Akins, Simon Fraser Univ, Dept Philosophy, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada