The many faces of belief: Reflections on Fodor's and the child's theory of mind

Journal/Book: Cognition. 1995; 57: PO Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, Netherlands. Elsevier Science Publishers BV. 241-269.

Abstract: I contrast Fodor's theory of the child's Very simple Theory of Mind (VSTM), which differs from adult folk psychology only in that it recognizes fewer intentional objects, with my view that children's concepts cross-cut the adult conceptual system. More specifically, young children do not distinguish between the state of affairs a belief is about and how this state of affairs is thought of, which puts a severe limit on their understanding of belief as distinct from pretence. The two different positions are evaluated against empirical data on children's developing ''theory of mind''.

Note: Article J Perner, Salzburg Univ, Inst Psychol, Hellbrunnerstr 34, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria

Keyword(s): FALSE BELIEF; AUTISTIC-CHILDREN; YOUNG-CHILDREN; DECEPTION; ATTRIBUTION; REPRESENTATIONS; PRESCHOOLERS; DESIRES; REALITY; MARKER

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