Are mental events preceded by their physical causes?

Author(s): Gillett, G.

Journal/Book: Philos Psychol. 1995; 8: PO Box 25, Abingdon, Oxon, England OX14 3UE. Carfax Publ Co. 333-340.

Abstract: Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events concerned given that Libet himself has found the reports of subjects to be unreliable in this regard. Third, there is a suspect assumption that there are such things as timable and locatable mental and brain events accompanying and causing human behaviour. For all these reasons we reject the claim that physical events are prior to and explain mental events.

Note: Article C Green, Univ Oxford Somerville Coll, 118 Banbury Rd, Oxford OX2 6JU, England

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