Wittgenstein's private language argument and children's understanding of the mind

Journal/Book: Develop Rev. 1997; 17: 525 B St, Ste 1900, San Diego, CA 92101-4495. Academic Press Inc Jnl-Comp Subscriptions. 291-320.

Abstract: A theoretical statement about children's understanding of the mind is derived from Wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein argued that understanding the mind is a process embedded in acquiring the rules governing the use of linguistic expressions about the mind. These rules are publicly agreed upon and, therefore, separable from one's subjective phenomenological experiences. The implications of this argument for theories which hold that children's understanding of the mind is based upon introspective insight (simulation view) and those which hold that understanding the mind is based upon the acquisition of a theory (theory view) are discussed. Developmental evidence illustrating Wittgenstein's private language argument and its differences from the simulation and theory views is presented. Points of compatibility between the theory view and Wittgenstein's private language argument are discussed. The paper closes by framing Wittgenstein's view in the broader context of children's linguistic and conceptual development and discussing the implications of these relations for future research.

Note: Review Montgomery DE, Bradley Univ, Dept Psychol, Peoria,IL 61625 USA

Keyword(s): YOUNG-CHILDREN; INTERPRETIVE DIVERSITY; KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION; NEGATIVE EVIDENCE; FALSE BELIEF; MENTAL VERBS; PERCEPTION; AGE; REMEMBER; INTENTIONALITY

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