What is more convincing in argumentation: Rhetorical aesthetics or communicative fairness?

Author(s): Groeben, N., Christmann, U.

Journal/Book: Z Exp Psychol. 1997; 44: Rohnsweg 25, D-37085 Gottingen, Germany. Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. 656-685.

Abstract: In this study we focus on the relation between argumentational integrity and aesthetics concerning their persuasive effects. With regard to the relation between (un-)fairness and aesthetic quality we have outlined three prototypical cases, which were empiricially tested as exploratory hypotheses: (a) superiority of aesthetics (b) fairness as a necessary condition for aesthetic effects, (c) compensation of a lack of aesthetics by fairness and vice versa. The variation of (un-)fairness of argumentational contributions is based on the empirically validated concept of argumentational integrity. The aesthetic quality of an utterance was conceptualized in a multi-relational manner based on a semiotic model of deviation what classifies rhetoric-stilistic figures as syntactic, semantic or pragmatic deviations,,Persuasive effectiveness' was operationalized by cognitive, emotional, and evaluative variables. In order to test hypotheses, argumentational episodes were constructed, representing different combinations of the two factors of (un-)fairness and aesthetic quality. After a factor analysis of the dependend variables, our conceptualization of aesthetics was validated in a design of variance analysis. Concerning our three prototypical cases, the data strongly support case (b) ''fairness as a necessary condition for aesthetic effects''. The data clearly show that in the case of fair contributions, semiotic deviations were considered particularly convincing, whereas in the case of unfair contributions, semiotic deviations could not compensate for the negative effects of unfairness.

Note: Article Mischo C, Univ Heidelberg, Inst Psychol, Hauptstr 47-51, D-69117 Heidelberg, GERMANY

Keyword(s): argumentation; rhetorics; aesthetics; persuasion; argumentational integrity

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