The presence of environmental objects to perceptual consciousness: Consideration of the problem with special reference to Husserl's phenomenological account

Journal/Book: J Mind Behav. 1996; 17: PO Box 522, Village Station, New York, NY 10014. Inst Mind Behavior Inc. 161-184.

Abstract: In the succession of states of consciousness that constitute James's stream of consciousness, there occur, among others, states of consciousness that are themselves, or that include, perceptual mental acts. It is assumed some of the latter states of consciousness are purely perceptual, lacking both imaginal and signitive contents; According to Husserl, purely perceptual acts present to consciousness, uniquely, their environmental objects in themselves, in person. They do not present, as imaginal mental acts do, an image or other representation of their object. Husserl's theory resembles Gibson's with respect to perception's being direct. Both theorists hold perceptual awareness of the environment is not a ''founded'' act; its proximate causation does not involve any other mental act. Both theorists contend that perceptual acts keep the perceiver directly in touch with the surrounding environment. The present article considers Husserl's account of this directness. Although this account has problems, and is largely phenomenological description, it may help psychologists to find their way to an adequate account of the objects of perceptual consciousness - perhaps if it is integrated with Gibson's perception theory, as I will attempt in a sequel to which this article is introductory. Husserl seeks eo provide the phenomenological side of the story, Gibson the stimulus-informational side.

Note: Article T Natsoulas, Univ Calif Davis, Dept Psychol, Davis, CA 95616 USA

Keyword(s): INTENTIONALITY

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