Musical chairs: Modeling noisy evolution

Author(s): Samuelson, L., Vaughan, R.

Journal/Book: Game Econ Behav. 1995; 11: 525B Street, Suite 1900, San Diego, CA 92101-4495. Academic Press Inc Jnl-Comp Subscriptions. 1-35.

Abstract: We examine an evolutionary process based on an explicit model of choice in which agents occasionally make mistakes in choosing their strategies. If the population size is sufficiently large, then the deterministic replicator dynamics provides a good approximation of the behavior of the system over finite time periods. The limiting behavior of the process is captured by combinatorial techniques introduced by Freidlin and Wentzell and popularized by Young and Kandori, Mailath, and Rob. We find conditions under which the limiting distribution selects the risk-dominant equilibrium in a 2 x 2 game and conditions under which the payoff-dominant equilibrium is selected. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.

Note: Article KG Binmore, Univ London Univ Coll, Dept Econ, Gower St, London WC1E 6BT, England

Keyword(s): GAME DYNAMICS; SELECTION

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