Toward a dialectic theory of concepts

Journal/Book: J Psycholinguist Res. 1995; 24: 233 Spring St, New York, NY 10013. Plenum Publ Corp. 377-404.

Abstract: The article spells out some guidelines for a dialectic theory of concepts. Concept formation is treated in terms of polemic and polar reference. The main thesis is that opposite references structure concepts by way of advocacy. On polar dimensions of comparison, (e.g., light versus dark), people select and advocate objects of comparison in agreement with the context of comparison (i.e., what is light depends on what is dark, and vice versa). In principle, any concept is subject to polemics because polarity enables opposite comparisons, (e.g., an object as dark and light with reference to lighter and darker objects, respectively). When opposite comparisons apply to the same object, reference becomes anomalous which will motivate conceptual change, (e.g., 'twilight' accounts for a reference ''in between''). Consequently, meaning is not secured by general rules but concepts presuppose advocated references; concepts are intentional constructs The dialectic theory is illustrated by a case study of the environmental discourse on forest management Conflicting references fuelled by industrial and environmental values demonstrate how opposite comparisons motivate revisions.

Note: Article T Andersson, Univ Uppsala, Dept Cultural Anthropol, Tradgardsgatan 18, S-75309 Uppsala, Sweden

Keyword(s): CATEGORIZATION; VAGUENESS; METAPHOR

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